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Abstract
It is common practice for public pension schemes to offer individuals the option to delay beneﬁt claiming
until after the normal retirement age and adjust the annual beneﬁt level as a result. This adjustment is often
not actuarially neutral with respect to the age at which beneﬁts are claimed. The degree of actuarial nonequiv-
alence varies by interest rates as well as individual characteristics such as gender and age. In this paper we
show that actuarial nonequivalence can imply that deferring beneﬁt claiming is suboptimal, irrespective of the
preferences of the individual. Speciﬁcally, we derive preference-free conditions under which delaying beneﬁt
claiming is dominated by claiming beneﬁts early, and using them to buy super-replicating annuity products
from an insurance company. We ﬁnd that the degree of actuarial nonequivalence in public pension schemes
is such that such dominating strategies can exist even when the purchase of annuities would be signiﬁcantly
more costly than what is currently observed. If individuals choose to strategically exploit these dominating
strategies, this will affect beneﬁt claiming behavior, which in turn affects long run program costs.
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11 Introduction
In many countries, individuals can decide either to claim their Social Security old-age pension beneﬁts once
the minimal retirement age has been reached, or to delay beneﬁt claiming. In case of delay, the individual is
offered the same choice next period and so on, until either the maximum age at which beneﬁts can be claimed
has been reached or beneﬁts have been claimed. When an individual defers pension receipts, the beneﬁt level
is subjected to an actuarial adjustment for each year that beneﬁt claiming is delayed.1 In many cases, the
adjustment is a constant fraction of the beneﬁt level at the normal retirement age, irrespective of age, gender,
and other individual characteristics. In the U.S. and the U.K., the beneﬁt levels increase by respectively 8%
and 10.4% for each year beneﬁt claiming is delayed (see Diamond, 2005; Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
In the Netherlands a proposal has been put forward to increase the beneﬁt level by only 5% for each year of
delay. As argued by, e.g., Horneff et al. (2008), governments seem to want simple and standardized rules for
annuitization applied to a large heterogeneous group of retirees, which may be the reason for choosing a ﬁxed
instead of an age-dependent accrual.
The adjustment of the beneﬁt level in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming is typically not actuarially neutral in
the sense that the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts in case beneﬁt claiming is delayed is typically
not equal to the expected present value of the additional beneﬁts received once beneﬁts are claimed (see, e.g.,
Coile et al., 2002; Duggan and Soares, 2002; Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009).
This lack of actuarial neutrality occurs for several reasons. First, the expected present value of the missed and
additional beneﬁts in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming depends on the term structure of interest rates. Higher
short-term interest rates typically decrease the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts relative to the
expected present value of the additional beneﬁts. The opposite holds for high long-term interest rates. The
adjustment of the beneﬁt level in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming, however, is typically ﬁxed for a number of
years and therefore not adjusted for changes in the term structure of interest rates. Second, an age-independent
accrual leads to actuarial unfairness because, as age increases, the number of years over which the increased
beneﬁt level should be paid out decreases, and the missed beneﬁts due to deferral of one more year increase.
Finally, the expected present value of the missed and additional beneﬁts in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming
dependon survivalrates, which dependon individualcharacteristics such as gender and socio-economicstatus.
Thus, heterogeneity among participants leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the individual level (see Brown,
2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003).2
1Such possibilities exist in Social Security pension systems in, e.g., the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, France,
Australia. (see Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
2The actuarial nonequivalence is well-documented in the literature. For example, Duggan and Soares (2002) calculate actuarially fair
adjustment factors when beneﬁts are claimed at ages 62 to 70, and ﬁnd that results depend strongly on both gender and discount rate. They
also ﬁnd that the annual accrual for delayed beneﬁt claiming of 8%, given in the U.S., is too low in most cases. Desmet and Jousten (2003)
show that there is a high degree of heterogeneity among participants of a large public pension system, so that beneﬁt adjustments that are
based on the ”average” participant can lead to large degrees of actuarial unfairness at the individual level .
2As argued by Duggan and Soares (2002) actuarially nonequivalent beneﬁt adjustments may have unintended
consequences in the sense that they affect claiming behavior. Coile et al. (2002) and Sun and Webb (2009)
consideroptimalclaimingofSocialSecuritybeneﬁtsintheU.S.,andarguethatevenwhentheadjustmentofthe
beneﬁt level is lower than actuarially fair, delaying beneﬁt claiming can be attractive to risk averse individuals.
This occurs because a risk-averse individual attaches more value to the increased longevity insurance due to
the higher beneﬁt level.3 Coile et al. (2002) ﬁnd that delaying Social Security annuitization for a period of
time after the minimal retirement age is optimal in a wide variety of cases under expected utility maximization.
Sun and Webb (2009) ﬁnd that, for plausible preference parameters, the optimal age to claim Social Security
beneﬁts for single individuals is between 67 and 70.
Our goal in this paper is to show that the actuarial unfairness inherent in many public pension systems implies
that an individual who wishes to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts may be better off by claiming Social
Security beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy annuity products. Consider, for example, a man aged
66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67. He can do so by deferring beneﬁt claiming with
one year, which implies that his beneﬁt level will be increased. Suppose now that the level of the accrual is
actuarially unfair for this particular man in the sense that the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts at
age66 is higherthantheexpectedpresentvalueof theadditionalbeneﬁts receivedas of age67. If the difference
is sufﬁciently large, insurers may be able to offer a deferred annuity that starts to pay out as of age 67, with a
beneﬁt level that is higher than the accrual offered by the pension provider, and for a periodic premium that is
lower than the beneﬁts received in case they are claimed at age 66. If this is the case, the individual is better
off by claiming beneﬁts at age 66, and using these beneﬁts to buy the deferred annuity.
In this paperwe characterizeconditionsunderwhich insurers can offersuper-replicatingannuityproducts. The
annuity product is super-replicating if it satisﬁes two conditions. First, it can be bought for a periodic premium
that is at most equal to the beneﬁt level obtained in case Social Security beneﬁts are claimed immediately.
Second, upon annuitization it yields a beneﬁt level that is at least equal to the beneﬁt level received in case
Social Security beneﬁts would have been claimed at that age. If these two conditions are satisﬁed, deferred
beneﬁt claiming is dominated because the individual is better off by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using
them to buy the annuity product. An important aspect of this approach is that because the annuity product
is super-replicating, there is preference-free dominance of immediate beneﬁt claiming. All that is required
for the individual to prefer claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy the annuity product is that
more is preferred to less. To characterize such preference-free dominance conditions, we consider two cases.
First we consider the case where an individual at a given age decides as of which age he would like to receive
3There is an extensive literature that characterizes individuals’ optimal behavior with regard to the timing and level of annuitization of
their wealth (see, e.g., Yaari, 1965; Brugiavini, 1993; Brown, 2001; Milevsky, 2001; Brown, 2003; Davidoff et al., 2005; Gupta and Li,
2007; Horneff et al., 2006; Milevsky and Young, 2007a,b; Gerrard et al., 2010, to name just a few). Our focus is on claiming behavior in
Social Security systems with delay options.
3his pension beneﬁts, and derive conditions under which insurers can offer deferred annuities that the individ-
ual prefers above deferring beneﬁt claiming. Next, we determine conditions under which insurers can offer
super-replicating annuity options for those individuals who want to defer receipt of pension beneﬁts until an
unspeciﬁed age. The individual who buys the annuity option can, year by year, decide whether he wants to
annuitize, or defer annuitization for at least one more year.
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicating annuity products depends on the degree of actuarial
unfairness in the Social Security system, as well as on how insurers price annuity products. Two factors are
important. First, annuities offered by insurance companies are typically also not actuarially fair in the sense
that the premium includes a load to cover costs. Second, in contrast to Social Security providers, insurers can
adjust premium conditions to the prevailing term structure of interest rates. Moreover, they can to some extent
differentiate premiums based on individual characteristics that affect survival rates. We ﬁrst consider the case
where insurers can differentiate premiums on the basis of age and gender only, and characterize conditions
on the level of the premium load and the term structure of interest rates under which they can offer super-
replicating annuity products to men and women, respectively. We ﬁnd that there is ample room for insurers to
proﬁtably offer annuity products that men prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. For women it is less likely
that dominating strategies exist. We then consider the case where insurers can also differentiate premiums
based on factors that are correlated with educational level. This additional ﬂexibility increases the room for
insurers to offer super-replicating annuity products, in particular to individuals with lower educational levels.
This occurs because individuals with lower educational levels have lower life expectancy, and therefore the
accruals offered by the social security system are more unfair for them.
Our results potentially have important implications because the existence of super-replicatingannuity products
can alter claiming incentives and may thereby distort beneﬁt acceptance decisions. Speciﬁcally, it can imply
that individuals may decide not to defer beneﬁt claiming, even though they do wish to defer annuitization. This
can affect the long-run program costs of public pensions (see Hurd et al., 2004). Beneﬁt claiming decisions
are not only important for public pensions but also for deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions. It is not uncommon
that participants in a (DB) pension plan can, at least to some extent, choose at which age they claim beneﬁts.
The annual beneﬁt level is then adjusted to the age at which beneﬁts are ﬁrst claimed. When the adjustments
are not actuarially neutral with respect to the age at which beneﬁts are claimed, participants may choose to
strategically exploit outside options offeredby insurance companies. This may affect claiming behavior,which
in turn affects the plan’s liabilities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses factors that generate actuarial unfair-
ness in Social Security pension systems with delay options. In Sections 3 and 4 we consider the case where
insurers differentiate premiums based on gender only, and characterize conditions under which they can offer
4super-replicating annuity products for men and women, respectively. We also quantify the potential gains for
both individuals and insurers. Section 3 considers individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts
to a speciﬁc age. Section 4 extends the analysis to cases where the individual wishes to defer the receipt of
pension beneﬁts to an unspeciﬁed age. In Section 5 we illustrate the potential gains when insurers can, in
addition to gender, also differentiate premiums on the basis of factors correlated with educational level. We
end with the conclusions in Section 6.
2 Actuarial unfairness
Existing literature shows that the option to delay Social Security beneﬁt claiming is often actuarially unfair in
the sense that the expectedpresent value of the additionalbeneﬁts in case of deferredbeneﬁt claiming is strictly
lower than the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts (see, e.g., Coile et al., 2002; Duggan and Soares,
2002; Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009). This unfairness implies that individuals
who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts may be better off by claiming beneﬁts immediately, and using
them to buy annuity products at the market. Our goal is to characterize under which conditions insurers can
offer annuity products that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming.
We focus on cases in which an individual wishes to delay the receipt of pension beneﬁts beyond the so-called
full retirement age, which we denote by x.4 Each year, the individual decides either to claim old-age pension
beneﬁts immediately, or to delay beneﬁt claiming for a period of at least one year.5 In case of delay, the
individual is offered the same choice next year and so on, until either the maximum age at which beneﬁts can
be claimed has been reached or beneﬁts have been claimed. We denote the maximum age at which beneﬁts can
be claimed by x. When the individual claims beneﬁts, he receives them in the form of a whole life annuity that
periodically pays a ﬁxed amount as long as he is alive. Without loss of generality, we normalize the annual
beneﬁt level in case beneﬁts are claimed at the full retirement age to 1. For each year of delay, the beneﬁt level
increases by a ﬁxed amount a, for some a > 0. Therefore, in case beneﬁt claiming is deferred until age y > x,
the annual beneﬁt level is equal to 1 + (y − x) · a.
Whether insurers will be able to offer more attractive delay options clearly depends on the degree of actuarial
unfairness in the Social Security system. This degree of unfairness depends not only on the accrual a, but also
on the term structure of real interest rates and individual characteristics that affect survival probabilities (see,
e.g., Duggan and Soares, 2002). First, higher long-term interest rates lead to less expensive annuities, which
4In many countries (including, e.g., the U.S.), individuals can also claim pension beneﬁts at an earlier age than the full retirement age,
in which case the beneﬁt level is adjusted downwards. Our focus is on delayed beneﬁt claiming.
5It is not uncommon that individuals can decide on a monthly basis to claim beneﬁts or delay beneﬁt claiming. For expositional
convenience, we assume that the decision is made annually.
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Figure 1: Term structures of real interest rates (in percentages), generated by a one-factor Vasicek model with
parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
may result in an opportunity for insurance companies to outperform the Social Security provider. Second, the
delayed retirement credit does not differ with individual characteristics (such as, e.g., gender) even though sur-
vival probabilities do differ with these characteristics. This leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the individual
level. Thus, even if the system would be fair for the “average” individual, it would be unfair to certain groups
of individuals (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003). Insurers can, at least to some extent, dif-
ferentiate premiums and may therefore be able to offer more attractive delay options to those individuals for
which the Social Security system is actuarially unfair.
To illustrate that the degree of actuarial unfairness can be signiﬁcant, and that it depends strongly on both the
term structure of real interest rates and individual characteristics, we determine the money’s worth of deferring
the receipt of pension beneﬁts. The money’s worth of the option to delay beneﬁt claiming is deﬁned as the ratio
of the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts over the expected present value of the additional beneﬁts
received as of claiming age (see, e.g., Sun and Webb, 2009). Let us denote R(τ) for the τ-years real interest
rate, and τpx for the probability that an individual with age x survives at least the ﬁrst τ years. Now consider
an individual aged x who wants to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts to age y. Because the missed beneﬁt
equals 1+a(x−x) at ages x,··· ,y −1, and the additional beneﬁt equals a·(y −x) annually as of age y, the
money’s worth of deferring beneﬁt claiming from age x to age y, denoted by MW(y,x), is given by:
MW(y,x) =
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Figure 2: The money’s worth of deferring Social Security beneﬁt claiming from age 66 to age y (i.e., MWy,66)
as a function of y, for men (left panel) and women (right panel), and for two term structures of interest rates,
generated by a one-factor Vasicek model with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B. The solid lines
(dashed lines) correspondto a real short rate of 2% (3%). The annualaccrual is a = 8%, and the full retirement
age is set at x = 66. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004.
Figure 2 displays the money’s worth of delaying beneﬁt claiming from age 66 to age y, for y = 67,··· ,70,
for men and women, and for the two term structures of real interest rates displayed in Figure 1.6 The solid
(dashed) lines correspondto the lower (upper) term structure. We consider the U.S. setting in which the annual
accrual offered by the Social Security system equals 8% (i.e., a = 0.08), and the full retirement age equals 66
(i.e., x = 66). Survival rates are those of U.S. males (females) for the years 2000 up to and including 2004, as
reported in the Human Mortality Database.7
The option to defer beneﬁt claiming to age y > 66 is actuarially unfair if the corresponding money’s worth is
below one, because this indicates that the expected present value of the additional annuity received as of age
y in return for delaying beneﬁt claiming is strictly lower than the present value of the missed beneﬁts at ages
66,···y − 1. Figure 2 shows that the degree of actuarial unfairness can be substantial, and that it depends
strongly on the term structure of real interest rates as well as on individual characteristics such as gender and
the preferred deferral period. First, comparing the solid and the dashed lines shows that the deferral option is
moreunfair wheninterest rates are high. When interest rates are higher(dashedlines), the money’sworth shifts
downwards for both men and women, and for all deferral periods. Higher long term interest rates decrease the
6The term structures are generated by a one-Vasicek model with parameters as displayed in Table 5 in Appendix B, and with a short
rate of 2% (solid lines) and 3% (dashed lines), respectively.
7Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Ger-
many). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009). The survival rates are displayed in
Figure 9 in Appendix A.
7value of the additional beneﬁts relative to the value of the missed beneﬁts, and therefore make deferral more
actuarially unfair. The ﬁgure also shows that the system is more unfair for men than for women, and more
unfair for those who wish to defer for a longer period. Because women have higher life expectancy than men,
they are expected to receive the increased beneﬁt for a longer period of time. Therefore, the money’s worth
of deferring beneﬁt claiming is signiﬁcantly lower for men than for woman. Consider, for example, the case
where the real interest rate is upwardslopingfrom2% forthe real short rate to just above3.3%for a maturityof
30 years (Figure 1, solid line).8 The money’s worth for men is below one for all deferral periods. For women,
the money’s worth is above one for deferral of at most two years, but strictly below one for longer deferral
periods. Finally, for both men and women and for both term structures, the money’s worth of deferring beneﬁt
claiming is decreasing in the length of the deferral period. Stated differently, the system is more unfair for
those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming more than for those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming
just a couples of years.
The above results suggest that the degree of actuarial unfairness in the Social Security system is substantial, in
particular for those who wish to defer beneﬁt claiming for a longer period. In the next sections we show that
this unfairness implies that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts may be better off by
claiming beneﬁts immediately, and using them to buy annuity products at the market.
3 Dominating strategies using deferred annuities
In this section we characterize conditions under which the market can offer annuity products that are preferred
by individuals above deferring pension beneﬁt claiming. The annuity products must be attractive for both
insurersand participants,implyingthat insurersshouldbe able to offerthemon proﬁtableterms andindividuals
should achieve a higher beneﬁt level by buying these products than by deferring beneﬁt claiming. Conditions
will be determined under which this holds. When these conditions are satisﬁed, claiming beneﬁts early and
using them to buy a deferred annuity dominates deferring beneﬁt claiming in the sense that the former strategy
is preferred to the latter, irrespective of the individual’s preference relation.9 An example of such a preference-
free choice is given below.
Suppose that a man with current age 66 would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67.
8The results in this case are similar to those reported in Sun and Webb (2009) using survival rates of the Social Security administration,
and a ﬂat term structure of 3%.
9When the insured claims beneﬁts, they generally are taxed. However, in case the income is used as a premium for annuities, they
are in many cases received taxfree and then taxed when the annuity pays out. In the U.S. there are some qualiﬁed retirement accounts in
which individuals can invest taxfree. The wealth invested can then be used to ﬁnance annuities, where the payments of the annuities are
taxed (see Brown et al., 2001). We assume a tax system were both premiums and returns on the premiums for annuities are exempted from
taxation, and only the annuity payments are taxed.
8Furthermore, assume that the beneﬁt level of his pension when he claims beneﬁts immediately
equals 100 and that when the man delays beneﬁt claiming by one year, his future beneﬁt level
will be increased by 8%. Thus, when he defers pension beneﬁt claiming from age 66 to age
67, he will receive an annual beneﬁt of 108 as of age 67. Now suppose that the man is able to
buy a deferred annuity at the market which gives an annual beneﬁt of 9 as of age 67 for a price
of 100. When he claims beneﬁts immediately and uses the beneﬁts to ﬁnance this deferred
annuity, he will receive an annual beneﬁt level of 109 as of age 67. We will therefore argue
that, independent of the individual’s preferences, claiming beneﬁts at age 67 is dominated by
claiming beneﬁts at age 66 and using the beneﬁts as a premium for a deferred annuity that
starts to pay out at age 67. The different strategies are displayed in Table 1.
Strategy Annual Cash ﬂow at age
66 67 68 69 70 ....
Claim 66 100 100 100 100 100 ...
Claim 67 - 108 108 108 108 ...
Claim 66, buy deferred annuity - 109 109 109 109 ...
Table 1: The annual payments in a stylized example for a man with age 66, for an accrual a of 8%, and for
different strategies.
From Table 1 it is clear that claiming beneﬁts at age 67 is dominated by claiming beneﬁts at age 66 and using
the beneﬁts received that year to buy a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age 67. Of course this is just
a stylized example and we still have to analyze the conditions under which insurers can indeed offer a higher
beneﬁt level. In the next subsection we determine sufﬁcient conditions under which the market can outperform
the option to delay as offered by the Social Security Administration. Unless mentioned otherwise, we consider
the U.S. setting in which the full retirement age is 66 (i.e., x = 66), the maximum retirement age is 70 (i.e.,
x = 70), and the annual accrual offered by the Social Security system is 8%.10
3.1 Characterizing conditions for dominance
In this section we consider an individual who, at a given age x (e.g., the full retirement age), decides as of
which age he would like to receive his pension beneﬁts, and derive preference-free conditions under which
insurers can offer deferred annuities that the individual prefers above deferring beneﬁt claiming.
For an individual aged x, deferring beneﬁt claiming to age y can be considered as buying a deferred real
annuity. The premium equals the missed beneﬁts at ages x,··· ,y − 1. In return for this premium, a deferred
10Because there is an earnings test for claiming beneﬁts before the full retirement age (i.e., between the age of 62 and 65) (see e.g., Song
and Manchester, 2007), we focus on individuals who wish to delay beneﬁt claiming beyond the full retirement age of 66. However, the
analysis can be easily extended to individuals who want to claim before the full retirement age.
9annuity with a beneﬁt level of (y − x) · a as of age y is received. For example, in case beneﬁt claiming is
deferred to age x + 1, a premium of 1 (i.e., the beneﬁt level in case the individual would have claimed at age
x) is used to ﬁnance a deferred annuity with start age x + 1, and beneﬁt level a. If the expected present value
of the additional beneﬁts is lower than the premium paid (i.e., when the money’s worth of this deferred annuity
is less than one), the deferred annuity offered by the pension provider is actuarially unfair, and so the market
may be able to outperform the pension provider by offering a more attractive deferred annuity.
Suppose that an individual with age x would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age y, with y > x. He
could do so by deferring beneﬁt claiming until age y, in which case the beneﬁt level will equal 1+(y −x) ·a.
Alternatively, however, the individual could claim beneﬁts at age x, and (conditional on being alive) use the
beneﬁts received up to age y as periodic premiums to ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age
y.11 Let by,x denote the beneﬁt level offered by the insurer. Then the aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age
y equals the sum of the Social Security beneﬁts that were claimed at age x, 1+(x−x)·a, and the payoff from
the deferred annuity, by,x, i.e.,
By,x := 1 + (x − x) · a + by,x. (1)
This strategy is preferred if insurers can offer a deferred annuity with a beneﬁt level by,x that is strictly higher
than the accrual offered by the Social Security system, i.e., if
by,x > (y − x) · a, (2)
Indeed, (1) and (2) imply that the aggregatebeneﬁt level is strictly higher than the beneﬁt level received in case
Social Security beneﬁt claiming is deferred to age y, i.e., By,x > 1 + (y − x) · a.
Whetherinsurerswill beable to offerdeferredannuitiesthat individualspreferabovedeferringbeneﬁtclaiming
clearly depends on the prices charged for deferred annuities. The annuity insurers offer is in general not
actuarially fair because insurers impose a premium load. The load may include costs for administration and
adverse selection, but also a risk premium, and is typically expressed as a percentage l of the premium (see,
e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999). Now consider an individual who claims beneﬁts at age x, and uses the beneﬁts
received at ages x,··· ,y − 1, as periodic premiums to ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age
y. Then, the beneﬁt level by,x that insurers would offer follows from setting the expected present value of the
11Alternatively, the individual could use only part of the claimed beneﬁts to buy a deferred annuity. It can be veriﬁed that assuming that
the claimed beneﬁts are fully used is without loss of generality. Deferring beneﬁt claiming is dominated by claiming immediately if and
only if this is the case when the claimed beneﬁts are fully used.
10premium net of cost loading equal to the expected present value of the payments of the deferred annuity, i.e.,















Combined with (2), this implies that claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity
dominates deferring beneﬁt claiming if
by,x :=














￿ > (y − x) · a. (4)
Whether this condition can be satisﬁed depends on the term structure of real interest rates as well as on the
premium load l. In the next subsection, we investigate the effect of the term structure of real interest rates and
the premium load on the existence of dominating strategies.
3.2 Effect of term structure and premium load
In this subsection conditions are characterized under which insurers can proﬁtably offer deferred annuities that
individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. To do so, we compare the beneﬁt levels individuals can
obtain by either delaying beneﬁt claiming or by claiming immediately and using the beneﬁts to buy a deferred
annuity at the market. We ﬁrst consider a base case in which the term structure of real interest rates is as
displayed in Figure 1, solid line. It is upward sloping from 2% for the real short rate to just above 3.3% for a
maturity of 30 years. The premium load equals 7.3%, i.e., l = 0.073.12 We then investigate the sensitivity of
the results with respect to changes in the term structure of real interest rates or in the premium load.
Table 2 displays the beneﬁt levels for the base case.
For any given age y = 66,··· ,70, the diagonal displays the beneﬁt level received as of age y when Social
Security beneﬁts are claimed at age y, and the off-diagonalelements (i.e., for x < y) yield the beneﬁt level the
individual receives as of age y when he claims Social Security beneﬁts at an earlier age x, and uses them to
ﬁnancea deferredannuitythat starts to payout at age y. If the latter exceedsthe former(boldentries), deferring
beneﬁt claiming is suboptimal. For example, in case a man aged 66 would like to receive pension beneﬁts as
of age 68, the dominating strategy he can follow is claiming beneﬁts immediately and using these beneﬁts to
buy a deferred annuity which starts paying off at age 68. Men with age 67 or higher and women with age 68
12For most maturities the interest rate is lower than the 3% real interest rate as assumed in for instance Sun and Webb (2009), and Coile
et al. (2002). The load is taken from the 1999 annuity value per premium dollar computed on an after tax basis in Mitchell et al. (1999).
11Annuity Claim age (x) Men Claim age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 70 66 67 68 69 70
66 1.00 1.00
67 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.08
68 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.16
69 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.24
70 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.32
Table 2: The aggregatebeneﬁt level receivedas of age y for an individualagedx, when Social Security beneﬁts
are claimed at age x and used to ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y (By,x, off-diagonal
elements), and when claiming Social Security beneﬁts is deferred to age y (diagonal elements). The left (right)
panel corresponds to men (women). The bold entries represent dominating strategies. The annual accrual a
equals 8% and the load l equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the
period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates is as displayed in Figure 1, solid line.
or higher are better off by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity than by
delaying beneﬁt claiming, regardless of how long they wish to defer the receipt of their pension beneﬁts.
Theaboveresults correspondto the termstructureas displayedinFigure1, solidline. Higherlong-terminterest
rates make deferredannuities cheaper, and so it becomes more likely that insurers will be able to offer deferred
annuities that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. The opposite holds for lower long-term
interest rates. To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to changes in the term structure of real
interest rates, we use a one-factor Vasicek model (Vasicek, 1977). In this one-factor model, the term structure
is fully determined by the short rate, and so the sensitivity of the results with respect to the term structure of
real interest rates can be investigated by varying the short rate. Details on the one-factor Vasicek model can be
found in Appendix B.
Figure 3 displays the beneﬁt level that an individual aged 66 can obtain as of age y, for y = 67,··· ,70, as a
function of the real short rate, and for two strategies: claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to ﬁnance
a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y (upward sloping lines), and deferring beneﬁt claiming until
age y (horizontal lines).
The ﬁgure shows that for each annuity age y, there exists a critical value of the real short rate at which the
individual is indifferent between these two strategies. Whenever the short rate is higher than this critical value,
annuities are relatively cheap, and insurers can proﬁtablyoffer annuities that yield higherbeneﬁt levels than the
accrual offered by the Social Security (upward sloping line higher than horizontalline). Thus, deferringbeneﬁt
claiming is dominated by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity. Below
the critical real short rate, deferring pension beneﬁt claiming is preferred above buying additional annuities
at the market. Second, the ﬁgure shows that dominating strategies are more likely to exist for men than for
women. For a man aged 66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67 (solid lines), claiming
beneﬁts early to ﬁnance a deferred annuity dominates delayed beneﬁt claiming in case the real short rate is
12The aggregate beneﬁt level as a function of the real short rate
























































Figure 3: The aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age y, as a function of the real short rate at age 66, when
Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age 66 and used to ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at
age y (By,66, upwardsloping lines), and when claiming Social Security beneﬁts is deferredto age y (horizontal
lines). The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annual accrual a equals 8% and the load l
equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term
structure of real interest rates corresponding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek
model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
above2.25%. For a woman, the critical real short rate for deferralof one year equals 4.7%, which is quite high.
As a result, dominating strategies are not likely to exist in this case. Finally, the ﬁgure shows that for both men
and women, the critical real short rate decreases when the age as of which they would like to receive pension
beneﬁts increases. For men (women), it decreases to -1.8% (1.2%) for deferral to age 70 (dashed-dotted lines).
This occurs because the system is more unfair for those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming more than
for those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming just a couples of years (recall that the money’s worth of
deferring beneﬁt claiming decreases when the deferral period increases, see Figure 2). Consequently, there is
more room for dominancefor individuals who wish to delay the receipt of pension beneﬁts for a longer period.
The above results correspondto settings where the premium load equals 7.3%. It is immediately clear from (4)
that a higher premium load reduces the beneﬁt level that insurers can offer for a given premium, and therefore
makes it less likely that insurers are able to offer deferred annuities that individuals prefer above deferring
beneﬁt claiming. In order to investigate the sensitivity of our results to the level of the premium load, we
determine the load such that the individual is indifferent between deferring beneﬁt claiming, and claiming
immediately and buying a deferred annuity. Consider an individual aged x would like to receive pension
beneﬁts as of age y, with y > x. The individual is indifferent between the two strategies if they yield the same
13beneﬁt level, i.e., if
by,x = (y − x) · a.
Therefore, it follows from (4) that the indifference load lmax is given by:
lmax = 1 −















￿ = 1 − MW(y,x).
As longas the premiumloadthat is strictly lower thanlmax, the market offersdeferredannuitiesthat (combined
with the Social Security beneﬁts claimed at age x) give a higher beneﬁt level than the beneﬁt level offered by
the Social Security provider in case beneﬁt claiming is delayed until age y. Thus, deferring beneﬁt claiming is
dominated by claiming immediately.
Table 3 displays the maximum load under which claiming Social Security beneﬁts and using them to buy a
deferred annuity dominates deferringbeneﬁt claiming, for all possible combinations of the claim age x and the
annuity age y > x.
Annuity Claim Age (x) Men Claim Age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 66 67 68 69
67 6.51 -6.64
68 12.41 16.39 -0.06 4.29
69 18.14 21.82 24.90 5.30 9.86 13.72
70 23.72 27.10 29.93 32.10 11.06 15.31 18.91 21.97
Table 3: The maximum load lmax (in percentages) under which, at age x, deferring beneﬁt claiming to age
y > x is dominated by claiming Social Security beneﬁts at age x and using them to buy a deferred annuity that
starts to pay out at age y. The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The accrual is set at a = 8%.
The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of
real interest rates is as displayed in Figure 1, solid line.
For men aged 66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67, the load insurance companies can
impose should be below 6.5%. However, for men who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts until at
least age 68, loads can be imposed that are signiﬁcantly higher than the benchmark level of 7.3%. For women
aged 66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67 or 68, dominating strategies will not exist
because a negative load is needed. This occurs because for them the option to defer beneﬁt claiming in the
Social Security system is more than actuarially fair (i.e., the money’s worth is higher than one; see Figure 2,
solid line). For women aged 68 or women who would like to defer beneﬁt claiming for a longer period, the
loads are also signiﬁcantly higher than the benchmark level.
144 Dominating strategies using annuity options
In the previoussection we characterizedconditionsunderwhichit is optimalfor theindividualto claim pension
beneﬁts at an earlier age than the age as of which he wants to receive annuity beneﬁts, and use the pension
beneﬁts to buy a deferred annuity. We considered the case where an individual at a given age decides as of
which age he would like to receive pension beneﬁts, so that a deferred annuity with the corresponding deferral
period can be bought. This section considers an individual who wishes to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts
until an unspeciﬁed age. We develop an annuity product, called an annuity option, in which the individual
can, year by year, decide whether he wants to annuitize or defer annuitization for at least one more year. We
characterize conditions under which insurers can offer annuity options that super-replicate those offered by the
Social Security provider.
4.1 Super-replicating annuity options
In this subsection we design an annuity option that super-replicates the option to delay beneﬁt claiming in the
Social Security system. The individual who buys this option pays a periodic premium (in case he is still alive)
until the time he decides to annuitize, and from there on receives annuity payments from the insurer. The level
of the periodic premium depends on the age at which the product is bought. The level of the annuity payment
depends on the age at which the option to annuitize is exercised, as well as on the age at which the option is
bought. Let us denote:
• x for the age at which the insured buys the annuity option;
• Y ∈ [x+1,x] for the age at which the insured annuitizes. Y is unknown until it is reached, we denote y
for any given realization of Y ;
• π(x) for the premium paid at ages z ∈ [x,Y − 1], conditional on being alive, and given that the annuity
option was bought at age x;
• by,x for the beneﬁt level of the annuity, conditional on annuitizing at age y, and given that the annuity
option was bought at age x. We assume that:
0 = bx,x ≤ bx+1,x ≤ ··· ≤ bx,x.
At eachagez ∈ [x+1,x−1],theindividualdecideseithertopaya premiumofπ(x) anddeferannuitizationfor
at least another year, or to stop paying premium and annuitize. When he annuitizes, he receives an immediate
15annuity from the insurance company with a beneﬁt level by,x that depends on his current age y, and the age x
at which he bought the annuity option. The beneﬁt levels are determined at the moment the annuity option is
bought.
This annuity option (weakly) dominates the option to delay beneﬁt claiming in the Social Security system if
the periodic premium is at most equal to the beneﬁt level obtained in case beneﬁts are claimed at age x, and,
for each possible annuity age y, the level of the annuity payment is at least equal to the accrual offered by the
Social Security system in case beneﬁt claiming would have been delayed to that age, i.e.,
π(x) ≤ 1 + (x − x) · a, (5)
by,x ≥ (y − x) · a, for all y = x + 1,··· ,x. (6)
If these two conditions are satisﬁed with at least one strict inequality, then for an individual aged x who did not
yetclaimpensionbeneﬁts,furtherdeferringbeneﬁtclaimingisdominatedbyclaimingbeneﬁts(of1+(x−x)·a)
and using (part of) these beneﬁts to pay the periodic premiums for the annuity option. Indeed, (5) implies that
the beneﬁts are sufﬁcient to pay the periodic premium, and (6) implies that, for any given annuity age y, the
aggregate beneﬁt level (from Social Security beneﬁts claimed at age x and from the annuity option),
By,x := 1 + (x − x) · a + by,x,
is weakly higher than the beneﬁt level received in case Social Security beneﬁt claiming is deferred to age y.
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicatingannuity options clearly dependson how they are priced.
Because the risk associated with uncertainty in the age at which the individual will exercise the option to
annuitize cannot be hedged, the payoffs of the annuity option cannot be replicated by payoffs from existing
assets. In the following subsection we determine conditions under which there exists a selfﬁnancing strat-
egy that super-replicates the payoffs of the annuity option. The strategy is selfﬁnancing if any new assets or
annuity payments can be ﬁnanced from revenues from previously bought assets combined with the premium
received from the individual. If these conditions are satisﬁed, insurers can offer annuity options that satisfy the
dominance conditions (5) and (6), while making nonnegative proﬁts in each future year.
4.2 The ﬁnancing strategy of the insurer
We ﬁrst design a strategy such that at every possible exercise date, the insurer holds a portfolio of zero-coupon
bonds with a market price equal to the price of the annuity in case the insured annuitizes at that date. If the
16insured does not annuitize, the payoff of the bond portfolio is used to ﬁnance a new bond portfolio. If the
insured annuitizes, the bond portfolio is sold to ﬁnance the immediate annuity. Formally, suppose that an
individual aged x buys an annuity option at time t = 0, and consider the following strategy:
• At agex, theinsurerknowsthat the beneﬁtlevelof theannuitywill be at least bx+1,x. He buysa portfolio
of zero-couponbonds which cash ﬂow matches the expected payments (plus cost loading) of the annuity
in case the insured annuitizes at age x + 1. Because survival probabilities beyond the age of 110 are





· spx, in years s = 1,...,110 − x.
• At age x < z < Y , the insured does not yet annuitize, and the insurer knows that the beneﬁt level upon
annuitization will be at least bz+1,x, i.e., the beneﬁt level increases by at least
e bz,x =bz+1,x − bz,x.




· spx, in years
s = z − x + 1,··· ,110 − x. Combined with bonds bought at ages x,··· ,z − 1, this implies that he
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· z−xpx from previously bought bonds, as well as a premium payment













· spx, in years s = Y − x,...,110 − x.
The market price of this bond portfolio equals the price of the annuity that pays off bY,x in every future
year that the insured is alive.
17This strategy yields the desired payoff as of age Y . For it to be selfﬁnancing, however, revenue at each age
before annuitization needs to be sufﬁcient to ﬁnance the new bond portfolio. In every year in which the insured
has not yet exercisedthe annuityoption, the insurer receivesrevenuewhich consists of the premiumpaid by the
insured and the cash ﬂow of previously bought bonds which mature. From this revenue, he needs to ﬁnance a
bondportfolio. The strategy thereforeinvolves losses when the price of the bondportfolioexceeds the revenue.
Moreover, for ages z > x, the price of the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age z depends on the term
structure of real interest rates in year t = z − x > 0. To eliminate this interest rate risk, the insurer can, for
each age z = x + 1,··· ,x − 1, buy a call option with maturity date t = z − x on the corresponding bond
portfolio. To minimize the price of the call options while still guaranteeing that revenue is sufﬁcient to buy the
bond portfolio, we set the strike price K(z,x) of the call option on the bond portfolio that needs to be bought








In the following table we summarize the insurer’s revenue and expenses at each age, with and without call
options. We denote PCalls(x) for the date t = 0 price of the portfolio of call options. Moreover, to avoid
overloadednotation, we denote PBonds(z,x) for the date t = z −x price of the bond portfolio that needs to be
bought at age z.








Expenses without options PBonds(x,x) PBonds(z,x)
with options PCalls(x) + PBonds(x,x) min{PBonds(z,x),K(z,x)}
Proﬁt without options +/− +/−
with options +/− +
Table 4: The insurer’s revenue and expenses at age z (i.e., in year t = z − x), for z = x,··· ,Y − 1, for an
insured who buys the annuity option at age x and exercises it at age Y , and for two ﬁnancing strategies: the
case where the insurer buys call options and the case where he does not buy call options. The last two rows
display the sign of the corresponding proﬁt (revenue minus expenses).
With call options,expensesat age x increase,but expenses at ages z ∈ [x+1,Y −1](weakly)decreasebecause
the required bond portfolio can be bought at the minimum of the market price and the strike price of the call
option. Moreover, because the strike price of the call option on the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at
a given age is set equal to the revenue at that age, the revenue always weakly exceeds the expenses at any age
z > x. Thus, the insurer can offer the annuity option at a nonnegativeproﬁt in every year if and only if revenue
18exceeds expenses at age x, i.e., if and only if
PCalls(x) + PBonds(x,x) ≤ π(x). (8)
Our goal is to characterize conditions on the premium load l, and the term structure of real interest rates under
which the dominance conditions (5) and (6), and the proﬁt condition (8) are satisﬁed. When these conditions
are satisﬁed, insurers can proﬁtably offer annuity options such that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of
pension beneﬁts until an unspeciﬁed age are better off by claiming beneﬁts and using them to buy the annuity
option. This approachis conservativein the sense that it assumes that the insurerwishes to eliminate all interest
rate risk. If insurers are willing to bear some risk, the conditions under which they can offer super-replicating
annuity options will become less strict.
4.3 When can the insurer proﬁtably offer a super-replicating annuity option?
In this section we ﬁrst determine conditionson the term structure of real interest rates under which insurers can
proﬁtablyoffersuper-replicatingannuityoptions. We then investigatethe sensitivity of these results to the level
of the premium load charged by insurers. Finally, we quantify the potential gains for insurers from offering
super-replicating annuity options.
To characterizeconditionsonthe term structureof real interest rates andthe proﬁtloadingunderwhichinsurers
can proﬁtably offer super-replicating annuity options, we consider the annuity option that replicates the option
to defer beneﬁt claiming in the Social Security system, i.e., we set
π(x) = 1 + (x − x) · a, (9)
by,x = (y − x) · a, for all y = x + 1,··· ,70. (10)
and investigate under which conditions an insurer who uses the selfﬁnancing strategy deﬁned in Subsection 4.2
makes a strictly positive proﬁt in the year in which the annuity option is sold (i.e., PCalls(x)+PBonds(z,x) <
π(x)). If this is the case, the insurer can proﬁtably offer the replicating annuity option because, as can be seen
from Table 4, the revenue weakly exceeds expenses in all future years. Moreover, since the proﬁt in the ﬁrst
year is strictly positive, either the annual premium π(x) could be decreased or the beneﬁt level for at least one
annuity age y could be increased, so that a super-replicating annuity option can be offered while still making
a positive proﬁt. An individual who wishes to defer annuitization until an unspeciﬁed age is then better off by
claiming beneﬁts and using them to buy that annuity option than by further delaying beneﬁt claiming. Indeed,
19either the individual has strictly more wealth before annuitization (if π(x) < 1 + (x − x) · a), or the beneﬁt
level as of annuitization is strictly higher for at least one annuity age (if by,x > (y − x) · a).
Expenses and revenue of the insurer








































Figure 4: The insurer’s revenue (π(x), horizontal lines) and expenses (PCall(x) + PBonds(x,x), downward
sloping lines) in the year in which the annuity option is sold, as a function of the real short rate at that time.
The solid (dashed) lines correspond to an individual who buys the annuity option at age x = 66 (x = 67). The
accrual a offered by the Social Security system is set at 8%, and the proﬁt load l equals 7.3%. The left (right)
panel corresponds to men (women). The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period
2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates correspondingto a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with
a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
Figure 4 displays the insurer’s revenue (horizontal lines) and expenses (downward sloping lines) in the year
in which the annuity option is sold, as a function of the real short rate at that time.13 The revenue equals the
premium paid by the individual. The expenses are equal to the price of the portfolio of call options and bonds
that needs to be bought at the time the contract is sold (for details, see Table 4). The ﬁgure considers two cases.
The solid lines correspond to an annuity option sold to an individual aged 66, for a periodic premium of 1 (i.e.,
the Social Security beneﬁt level if beneﬁts are claimed at age 66). The dashed lines correspond to an annuity
optionsold to an individualaged 67, for a periodicpremiumof 1.08 (the Social Security beneﬁt level if beneﬁts
are claimed at age 67).
First consider men who buy the annuity option at age x = 66 (left panel, solid lines). The ﬁgure shows that
there exists a critical value of the real short rate at which the insurer’s expenses in the ﬁrst year are equal to
the revenue (the premium received from the insured). When the real short rate is above the critical value of
2.25%, the portfolioof call options andbonds becomesless expensive,i.e., the expenses decrease. This implies
13Recall that in the one-factor Vasicek model, the term structure is fully determined by the short rate, and so the sensitivity of the results
with respect to the term structure of real interest rates can be investigated by varying the short rate. Details on the Vasicek model as well
as on how the price of the portfolio of call options and bonds is determined can be found in Appendices B and C.
20that the insurer can proﬁtably offer a super-replicating annuity option. Men aged 66 who wish to defer beneﬁt
claiming until an unspeciﬁed age are then better off by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy
that annuity option. Indeed, that strategy yields a higher beneﬁt level, regardless of when they will decide to
annuitize. When the annuity option is bought at age of 67 instead of age 66 (left panel, dashed lines), the
conditions for dominance are even more likely to be fulﬁlled. The reason is that the maximum premium the
insurer can ask (the beneﬁt level in case Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age 67) increases from 1 to
1.08, and the minimum beneﬁt level that he needs to offer when the individual annuitizes at age y (the accrual
offered by the Social Security beneﬁts when beneﬁt claiming is deferred to age y) decreases from (y − 66) · a
to (y −67)·a. Therefore, the insurer’s revenue increases (the horizontal line shifts upwards), and the expenses
decrease (the downward sloping line shifts downwards). For men aged 67 (left panel, dashed lines), a positive
real short rate is enough for them to prefer buying an annuity option above deferring beneﬁt claiming. For
women (right panels), dominating strategies are less likely to exist. Because they have higher life expectancy,
the option offered by the Social Security provider is less unfair for them. For women aged 66, the real short
rate would need to be well above 4%, which is unlikely to be the case. For women aged 67, insurers can offer
annuity options that they prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming if the real short rate is above 2.75%.
The above results correspond to a premium load of 7.3%. In order to investigate the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the level of the premium load, we determine the maximum value of the premium load under
which an insurer who follows the selfﬁnancing strategy described in Subsection 4.2 can proﬁtably offer the
replicating annuity option. Speciﬁcally, we determine the load such that the insurer’s expenses in the ﬁrst year
equal the premium received from the insured in that year, i.e., PCalls(x) + PBonds(z,x) = π(x). Whenever
the load charged by insurers is strictly lower than this maximum load, the market can offer super-replicating
annuity options that individuals strictly prefer above deferring Social Security beneﬁt claiming.
Figure 5 displays the maximum feasible load as a function of the real short rate. The solid (dashed) lines
correspond to a super-replicating annuity option sold to an individual aged 66 (67). The left panel corresponds
to men; the right panel corresponds to women. Because higher values of the real short rate make annuities less
expensive, the maximum feasible load is increasing in the real short rate. There is more room for insurers to
offer annuity products that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming when interest rates are high. For
men who buy the annuity option at age 66, the feasible load is above 7% whenever the short rate is at least
2%. For women, the maximum load is negative for most realistic values of the real short rate, indicating that
dominating strategies are not likely to exist. However, when the product is bought at age 67, the maximum
feasible load increases signiﬁcantly for both men and women.
The above results were determined for the case where the insurer uses a conservative ﬁnancing strategy in
which all interest rate risk is eliminated. Insurers, however, may be willing to take some risk, which implies
21Maximum feasible load as a function of the real short rate


































Figure 5: The maximum load lmax (in percentages) under which insurers can offer a super-replicating annuity
option to men (left panel) and to women (right panel) aged 66 (solid lines) and aged 67 (dashed lines), as a
function of the real short rate. The accrual a is set at 8%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males
(females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a speciﬁc real
short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
that there may be more room to offer super-replicating annuity options. To conclude this section, we therefore
quantifythe potential gains for insurersfrom offeringsuper-replicatingannuityoptions underthe two ﬁnancing
strategies described in Subsection 4.2: eliminating all interest rate risk by buying a portfolio of call options,
and accepting some interest rate risk. In both cases, the ﬁnancing strategy is such that upon annuitization, the
insurer holds a portfolio of bonds with a market price equal to the market price of the annuity. Therefore, the
insurer’s proﬁt consists of proﬁt made in all years prior to annuitization.
As an illustration, we consider a super-replicating annuity option sold to an individual aged 66 for a periodic
premium equal to 1 (the Social Security beneﬁts claimed at age 66), with beneﬁt levels given by:
by,x = 0.08, for y = 67,
= 0.08 + (y − 67) · 0.09, for y = 68,··· ,70.
(11)
Thus, the beneﬁt level received upon annuitization is strictly higher than the accrual offered by the Social Se-
curity system as soon as annuitization is delayed until at least age 68. We determine the probabilitydistribution
of the present value of the insurer’s proﬁts in all years prior to annuitization,in case the individualexercises the
option to annuitize at age 68. The proﬁt in the ﬁrst year depends on the short rate at the time the annuity option
is sold (i.e., when the individual turns 66); the proﬁt made in the year in which the insured turns 67 depends
on the short rate next year (see Table 4 for details on these proﬁts). The former is known when the contract is
22offered, but the latter is stochastic.
Figure 6 displays the probability distribution of the insurer’s proﬁt for two values of the short rate at the time
the contract is sold. The upper (lower) panel corresponds to the case where the real short rate at the time the
contract is sold equals 2.25% (3%). In each case, the ﬁgure displays the present value of the insurer’s proﬁt as
a function of the real short rate next year (bars), as well as the probability that the real short rate next year falls
into the corresponding bracket (stems). It considers two ﬁnancing strategies: buying call options (light grey
bars) and not buying call options (dark grey bars). The premium load is set equal to 7.3%. Proﬁt values are
displayed on the left y-axis, probability values are displayed on the right y-axis.
The ﬁgure shows that for both ﬁnancing strategies and for both values of the short rate at the time the contract
is sold, the insurer’s proﬁtis (weakly)increasingin the real short rate next year. This occurs becauseand higher
short rate next year makes the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age 67 less expensive. Comparing the
upper and the lower panel shows that proﬁts are also increasing in the current real short rate. A higher real
short rate at the time the contract is bought (lower panel) makes the portfolio that needs to be bought in the ﬁrst
year less expensive, and, in addition, makes it more likely that the short rate in the second year is also higher,
so that the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age 67 also becomes less expensive. When the short rate
at the time the contract is sold equals 3%, the insurer’s proﬁt is almost surely positive even when interest rate
risk is not hedged.
We now discuss the effect of the ﬁnancing strategy. When call options are bought, the ﬁrst year proﬁt is strictly
lower, but the second year proﬁt is weakly higher because the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age
67 can then be bought at the minimum of the market price and the strike price of the call option. Because the
market price of the bond portfolio is decreasing in the short rate, there exists a critical value of the short rate
in the second year such that the present value of proﬁts with call options is lower (higher) when the short rate
is below (above) the critical value. Speciﬁcally, when the short rate in the second year is above 2.125%, the
market price of the bond portfolio is lower than the strike price of the call option. Therefore, the proﬁt made in
the second year is the same for the two ﬁnancing strategies, and so the present value of proﬁts is lower when
call options are bought. The difference (the price of the call options) is about 0.5% of the annual premium
when the current short rate is 2.5% (upper panel, dark grey bars), and negligibly small in case the current short
rate is 3% (lower panel). When the short rate in the second year falls below the critical level of 2.125%, the
price of the bond portfolio is strictly higher than the strike price. Therefore, the second year’s proﬁt is zero in
case the insurer bought call options, but strictly negativein case he did not. So, without call options the present
value of proﬁts can be negative, but the size and likelihood of such losses depend strongly on the current real
short rate. When the current short rate is 2.25% (upper panel), a loss is made whenever the short rate falls
below the critical level of 2.125%. In contrast, when the current short rate is 3% (lower panel), the proﬁt made
23The present value of the insurer’s proﬁt
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Figure6: The present valueof the insurer’s proﬁtfor a man who buys the annuityoptionat age 66 andexercises
it at age 68. The bars represent the present value of the insurer’s proﬁt as a function of the real short rate
next year, for two ﬁnancing strategies: buying call options (light grey bars) and not buying call options (dark
grey bars). The stems represent the probability that the real short rate next year falls into the corresponding
bracket.Proﬁt values are displayed on the left y-axis, probability values are displayed on the right y-axis. The
upper (lower) panel corresponds to the case where the real short rate at age 66 equals 2.25% (3%). The beneﬁt
levels of the annuity option are as given in (11). The accrual offered by the Social Security system is set at
8%. The premium load is set equal to 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for
the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a speciﬁc real short rate is
generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
24in the ﬁrst year is signiﬁcantly higher, and high enough to compensate for the loss made in the second year as
long as the short rate is in the second year is not below 1.375%. The probability that the short rate falls below
this level is negligibly small, so that the insurer almost surely makes no losses, even when interest rate risk is
not hedged.
4.4 How much can individuals gain from buying annuity options?
The previous subsection shows that, depending on the real short rate and the premium load, insurers can make
signiﬁcant proﬁts from offering a replicating annuity option. This suggests that they may also be able to offer
annuityoptionswith beneﬁt levelsthat are signiﬁcantlyhigherthan thoseofferedby the Social Securitysystem,
while still making a nonnegative proﬁt. In this subsection we quantify the potential gains for individuals from
such super-replicating annuity options.
Recall that in case of delayed Social Security beneﬁt claiming, the accrual received for an additional year of
delay equals a for every year of delay. Such a ﬁxed accrual implies that the deferral option is more unfair for
those who wish to defer for a longer period (recall that the money’s worth is decreasing in the length of the
deferral period, see Figure 2). This occurs because the expected number of years over which the additional
beneﬁt payment should be made decreases when beneﬁt claiming is delayed further. Consequently, insurers
might be able to offer annuity options in which the accrual received for an additional year of delay increases
each year. To illustrate the potentialgains for insureds, we considerthe case where the insurer offersan annuity
option with the following conditions:




(1 + c)τ · b, (13)
for some b,c ∈ (0,1]. Thus, the annual premium for the annuity option is equal to the Social Security beneﬁts
received in case they are claimed at age x, and the accrual received for an additional year of delay increases by
c% each year. Consider, for example, an individual aged x = x = 66 who would like to defer the receipt of
pension beneﬁts. If he claims Social Security beneﬁts immediately and uses them to buy the annuity option, he
will receive an annual beneﬁt level as of age 69 of 1 +
￿
1 + (1 + c) + (1 + c)2￿
· b. In contrast, if he delays
Social Security beneﬁt claiming until age 69, he receives 1 + 3 · a.
Figure 7 displays the total beneﬁt levels received as of age y = 67,··· ,70, as a function of the real short rate,
for two strategies: the case where the individual claims beneﬁts at age x and uses them to buy the annuity
25Beneﬁt level as a function of the real short rate
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Figure 7: The aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age y, as a function of the real short rate at age x, when
Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age x and used to buy the annuity option (By,x, upward sloping lines),
and when claiming Social Security beneﬁts is deferred to age y (horizontal lines). The upper (lower) panel
corresponds to x = 66 (x = 67). The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annual accrual
a equals 8% and the load l equals 7.3%. The beneﬁt levels of the annuity option are as deﬁned in (13) with
c = 0.1. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term
structure of real interest rates corresponding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek
model, with parameters given in Table 5 in Appendix B.
26option (upward sloping lines), and the case where he defers beneﬁt claiming until age y (horizontal lines). The
upper (lower) panels correspond to x = 66 (x = 67). The beneﬁt levels offered in the annuity option are as
deﬁned in (13). To illustrate the potential gains for individuals, we choose c = 10%, and let b be the level that
insurance companiescan offer in a competitivemarket in which excess proﬁts are drivento zero (i.e., condition
(8) is satisﬁed in equality). The accrual offered in the Social Security system is set at a = 8% and the premium
load is set at l = 7.3%.
The ﬁgure shows that insurance companies are able to offer an attractive alternative to the option to defer
pension beneﬁt claiming as offered by the Social Security provider when the real short rate is sufﬁciently high.
Strict dominanceoccurs when for every given annuitizationage y, the beneﬁt level received in case the annuity
option is bought is higher than when beneﬁt claiming is deferred (i.e., the upward sloping line is above the
horizontal line for all annuity ages y). In order to have strict dominance a real short rate of 2.25% is needed for
men and of 4% for women. However, some individuals may know for sure that they do not wish to annuitize
before a certain age. In such cases, insurers are able to offer attractive annuity options even when the short rate
is lower. Suppose, for example, that an individual with age 66 knows that he would like to defer annuitization
until at least age 68. Then, dominating annuity options exist already when the real short rate is above 1% for
men and 3.5% for women. When the individual knows he would like to defer until at least 69, the critical
values of the real short rate decrease to 0.25% for men, and 2.75% for women. There is even more room for
insurers to offer attractive annuity options when the option is bought at age 67 (lower panels). An individual
can, for example, defer social security beneﬁt claiming until age 67, and then use the claimed beneﬁts to buy
an annuity option. In this case, insurers can offer a product that dominates further delay of pension beneﬁt
claiming irrespective of the real short rate for men. The reason is that a higher annual premium is paid (1.08
instead of 1) and that the minimum required beneﬁt level upon annuitization (the accrual offered by the Social
Security beneﬁts when beneﬁt claiming is further deferred to age y) decreases.
5 Dominating Strategies using differentiated survival rates
In the previous sections we characterized conditions under which insurers can offer super-replicating annuity
products, taking into account that they can differentiate premium and beneﬁt levels on the basis of gender.
There is strong empirical evidence, however, that mortality rates also depend substantially on individual char-
acteristics such as, for example, educational level. This heterogeneity leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the
individual level (see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003). In contrast to Social Security providers,
insurers may, at least to some extent, be able to differentiate premiums on factors that affect survival probabil-
ities. If this is the case, there is more room to offer super-replicating annuity products for those individuals for
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Figure 8: The beneﬁt level (B67,66) as a function of the real short rate for different groups who buy an option
to annuitize at age 66 and annuitize at age 67. The horizontal line denotes the beneﬁt level when beneﬁts are
claimed at age 67. A factor c of 10% and a load l of 7.3% were assumed. The survival probabilities are those
of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to
a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in Table 5 in
Appendix B.
which the accruals offered in the Social Security system are more unfair. To illustrate the potential effects, we
characterize conditions under which insurers are able to offer the super-replicating annuity option deﬁned in
(13) to groups of individuals who differ in educational level. Three educational levels are distinguished: less
than high school, high school plus up to three years of college, and college graduates. We use relative mortality
factors differentiated to age, gender, and educational level determined by Brown (2003) to calculate the differ-
entiated survival probabilities (see Appendix D). As in the previous section we consider the case where excess
proﬁts are driven to zero, i.e., the beneﬁt level b is such that the insurer’s proﬁt in the ﬁrst year is zero.
Figure 8 displays the beneﬁt level that an individual aged 66 can obtain as of age 67, as a function of the real
short rate at age 66, and for two strategies: claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy the annuity
option (upward sloping lines), and deferring beneﬁt claiming until age 67 (horizontal lines). It distinguishes
three educational levels: low education (solid lines), high school education (dashed lines), college graduate
(dashed-dotted lines). The ﬁgure shows that the critical level of the real short rate above which insurers can
offer super-replicating annuity options is increasing in the educational level. Because individuals with lower
educational levels have lower life expectancy, they expect to receive the additional beneﬁts offered by the So-
cial Security system for a shorter period of time, which implies that the system is more unfair for them. The
differencesfor menare large. For menwith low education,the critical short rate is 0.2%. For collegegraduates,
28it increases to 2.7%.
6 Conclusions
In many countries accruals to annual pension beneﬁts are offered to those who claim beneﬁts later. Typically,
these accruals are ﬁxed for a number of years, and are independent of both interest rates and individual char-
acteristics such as gender. In addition, the accrual received for an additional year of delay is typically a ﬁxed
percentage of the beneﬁt level in case beneﬁts are claimed at the full retirement age. The actuarially fair value
of the additional deferred annuity that the individual receives in case he delays beneﬁt claiming, however, de-
pends nontrivially on the length of the deferral period, the term structure of real interest rates, and individual
characteristics that affect survival rates. As a consequence, public pension systems with ﬁxed accruals are not
actuarially fair, and the degree of unfairness varies over time (as it depends on the term structure of real interest
rates). Moreover, the degree of unfairness depends on individual characteristics.
We show that the actuarial unfairness implies that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts
may be better off by claiming beneﬁts and using them to buy annuity products at the market. Conditions under
which it is optimal for them to do so are investigated in a preference-free setting assuming only that more is
preferred to less. We ﬁrst quantify the degree of unfairness in the public pension system on the basis of the
market term structure of real interest rates, generated by a Vasicek term structure model. We then characterize
conditions under which insurers can offer attractive deferral options without taking any interest rate risk. Our
results suggest that there is a broad range of settings (for market conditions, required premium loads, and indi-
vidual characteristics) in which insurers can proﬁtably offer deferral options that are more actuarially fair than
those offered by the public pension provider. Individuals can exploit these options by claiming beneﬁts early,
and using them to buy annuity products from insurers. The potential gains for individuals and insurers increase
when market conditions are more favorable (e.g., when interest rates are relatively high), and when insurers
have more ﬂexibility to differentiate premium and beneﬁt levels on the basis of individual characteristics. If in-
dividuals choose to strategically exploit outside options offered by insurance companies, this will affect beneﬁt
claiming behavior, which in turn affects long run program costs.
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Appendix A Survival Probabilities
Throughout the paper, we use the one-year mortality probabilities differentiated to age and gender reported by
the Human Mortality Database for U.S. males (females) for the year 2000 up to and including 2004.14 Let qx
denote the probability that an individual with age x dies within one year. The probability that an individual is





Figure 9 displays the cumulative survival probabilities, conditional on being alive at age 66, i.e., τp66, as a
function of τ.
Cumulative Survival Probabilities























Figure 9: The cumulative survival probabilities (τp66), as a function of age (66 + τ) for men (solid line) and
women (dashed line) respectively with age 66.
Appendix B The One-factor Vasicek Model
The Vasicek model assumes that the instantaneous real short rate at time t, rt, is generated by:
drt = κ[θ − rt]dt + σdWt, r(0) = r0,
14Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Ger-
many). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009).
30where Wt is a Wiener process, θ denotes the long-run mean, κ the parameter of mean reversion, and σthe
volatility.
The time-t price of a zero-coupon bond which matures at time T, denoted by P(rt,t,T), is given by:
P(rt,t,T) = exp{A(t,T)}·exp{−B(t,T) · rt},
with
B(t,T) =
1 − exp{−κ · (T − t)}
κ
, (14)
A(t,T) = [B(t,T) − (T − t)]
￿








and where λ denotes the market price of risk. Then, the time-t real interest rate for a maturity of T − t years











Table 5: The parameter values of the Vasicek model for interest rate.
The long-term average θ is set equal to 2%. Moreover, the market price of risk λ is set equal to 0.5. This
reﬂects a setting in which the real interest rate for a maturity of six years is 0.5% higher than the short rate.
The benchmark case displayed in Figure 1, solid line, corresponds to the case where the real short rate equals
the long-term average θ.
Appendix C Pricing call options on bond portfolios
In this subsectionwe determine the price PCalls(x) of the portfolioof call optionsthat the insurer buys in order
to eliminate interest rate risk. Jamshidian (1989) has derived an exact formula to price options on (coupon-
bearing) bonds, assuming that interest rates are generated by a one-factor Vasicek model. The pricing problem
31is further addressed in Hull (2003) and Brigo and Mercurio (2001). Let us denote P(r,t,s) for the date-t price
of a zero-couponbond with maturity date s, given that the real short rate at time t equals r. The date-0 price of
a call option with strike price K and maturity date t, on a zero-couponbond with maturity s and principal L, is
given by:
C(s,t,K,L) = L · P(r0,0,s)Φ(h) − K · P(r0,0,t) · Φ(h − σP),
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, r0 denotes the real short rate at time



















respectively, where κ denotes the parameter of mean-reversion and σ denotes the volatility of real short rate.
Recall that, for each age z = x +1,··· ,x − 1, the insurer needs to buy a call option with strike price K(z,x)
given by (7), on a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds with maturity dates s = z − x + 1,...,110 − x, and with





spx. The price of this call option is equal to the price of a portfolio
of call options, one for each individual zero-coupon bond, where the strike prices K(z,x,s) of the individual
call options are such that
P
K(z,x,s) = K(z,x), and they all have the same exercise region, i.e.,
K(z,x,s) = Lz,x,s · P(r∗,z − x,s)
with r∗ such that:
110−x P
s=z−x+1
Lz,x,s · P(r∗,z − x,s) = K(z,x).
(18)







C(s,z − x,K(z,x,s),Lz,x,s), (19)




spx, and with K(z,x,s)
determined by (7) and (18).
32Appendix D Differentiated survival probabilities
In this Appendix we discuss how we determine survival rates differentiated by age, gender, and educational
level using the relative mortality factors from Brown (2003). He constructs age-speciﬁc relative mortality
factors for black, white, and Hispanic men and woman, where the white and black groups are then further
differentiated on the basis of education. Three educational levels are distinguished for whites, namely: less
than high school, high school plus up to three years of college, and college graduates. To obtain survival
probabilities differentiated by educational level, we multiply the relative mortality factors for white men and
women with different educational level with the mortality probabilities from the Human Mortality database
as described in Appendix A. Let c
(e)
x denote the relative mortality factor of an individual with age x with
educational level e. The probability that an individual with educational level e is alive over τ years conditional





(1 − qx+υ−1 · c
(e)
x+υ−1)
The differentiated cumulative survival probabilities for whites are displayed in Figure 10.
Cumulative Survival Probabilities

















































Figure 10: The cumulative survival probabilities differentiated to gender and educational level for men (left)
and women (right), conditional on being alive at age 66.
33Acknowledgments
We thank James Mahaney, Roel Mehlkopf, Kathrin Nies, Kim Peijenburg, Ralph Stevens, Dani¨ el van Vuuren,
and Anthony Webb for helpful suggestions. Useful comments were also received from seminar participants
at the 2009 IME meeting, the Netspar Lunch Seminar, Pension Day and Pension Workshop, and the Dutch
Central Planning Bureau (CPB).
References
Brigo, D. and Mercurio, F. (2001). Interest rate models theory and practice, chapter 3, pages 43–121. Springer
Finance. Springer.
Brown, J. R. (2001). Private pensions, mortality risk, and the decision to annuitize. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 82(1):29–62.
Brown, J. R. (2003). Redistribution and insurance: mandatory annuitization with mortality heterogenuity.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70(1):17–41.
Brown, J. R., Mitchell, O. S., Poterba, J. M., and Warshawsky, M. J. (2001). The role of annuity markets
in ﬁnancing retirement, chapter Taxing retirement income: nonqualiﬁed annuities and distributions from
qualiﬁed accounts, pages 185 – 226. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Brugiavini, A. (1993). Uncertainty resolution and the timing of annuity purchases. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 50(1):31–62.
Coile, C., Diamond, P., Gruber, J., and Jousten, A. (2002). Delays in claiming social security beneﬁts. Journal
of Public Economics, 84(3):357–385.
Davidoff, T., Brown, J. R., and Diamond, P. A. (2005). Annuities and individual welfare. American Economic
Review, 95(5):1573–1590.
Desmet, R. and Jousten, A. (2003). The decision to retire: iindividual heterogeneity and actuarial neutrality.
CEPR Working Paper 593.
Diamond, P. A. (2005). Reforming public pensions in the us and the uk. MIT Working paper 05-19.
Duggan, J. E. and Soares, C. J. (2002). Actuarial nonequivalence in early and delayed social security beneﬁt
claims. Public Finance Review, 30(3):188–207.
Gerrard, R., Højgaard, B., and Vigna, E. (2010). Choosing the optimal annuitization time post retirement.
Quantitative Finance, Forthcoming.
34Gupta, A. and Li, Z. (2007). Integrating optimal annuity planning with consumption-investment selections in
retirement planning. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 41(1):96–110.
Horneff,W., Maurer,R., Mitchell, O., andDus, I.(2006). Optimizingthe retirementportfolio: Asset allocation,
annuitization, and risk aversion. NBER working paper 12392.
Horneff, W. J., Maurer, R., and Stamos, M. Z. (2008). Optimal gradual annuitization: Quantifying the costs of
switching to annuities. Journal of Risk & Insurance, 75(4):1019–1038.
Hull, J. C. (2003). Options, Futures and Other Derivativess, chapter 23, pages 537–570. Prentice Hall, 5
edition.
Hurd, M. D., Smith, J. P., and Zissimopoulos, J. M. (2004). The effects of subjective survival on retirement
and social security claiming. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19(6):761–775.
Jamshidian, F. (1989). An exact bond option formula. Jounal of Finance, 44(1):205–209.
Milevsky, M. A. (2001). Optimal annuitization policies: Analysis of the options. North American Actuarial
Journal, 5(1):57–69.
Milevsky, M. A. and Young, V. R. (2007a). Annuitization and asset allocation. Journal of Economic Dynanimc
& Control, 31(9):3138–3177.
Milevsky, M. A. and Young, V. R. (2007b). The timing of annuitization: Investment dominance and mortality
risk. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 40(1):135–144.
Mitchell, O. S., Poterba, J. M., Warshawsky, M. J., and Brown, J. R. (1999). New evidence on the money’s
worth of individual annuities. American Economic Review, 89(5):1299–1318.
Queisser, M. andWhitehouse,E. (2006). Neutralorfair? actuarialconceptsandpension-systemdesign. OECD
Social Employment and Migration Working Papers, 40.
Song, J. G. and Manchester, J. (2007). New evidence on earnings and beneﬁt claims following changes in the
retirement earnings test in 2000. Journal of Public Economics, 91(3-4):669–700.
Sun, W. and Webb, A. (2009). How much do households really lose by claiming social security at age 62.
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Unpublished Working Paper.
Vasicek, O. (1977). An equilibrium characterization of the term structure. Journal of Financial Economics,
5(2):177–188.
Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. Review of Economic
Studies, 32(2):137–150.
35